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Best in Class: Public Finances in 
Sweden during the Financial Crisis 
 
Summary: This paper studies why public finances in Sweden have remained
very strong during the current financial crisis. Unlike almost all other European
countries, Sweden has had budget surpluses and a government debt ratio 
around 40 percent of GDP during the recent crisis. We attribute this to two
important factors. First, Sweden entered the crisis with strong public finances
and second that unemployment did not rise as much as normally during reces-
sions. The Swedish fiscal framework that was introduced after the banking
crisis in the early 1990s with expenditure ceilings, a top-down budget process, 
balanced budget requirement for local governments has played an important
role. We show that the behavior of budget deficits has changed significantly
recently, from a deficit bias to a surplus bias. Aggregate demand remained
strong during the crisis even though exports fell sharply. As unemployment in
the manufacturing sector increased, it was to a large extent offset by increased 
employment in the service sector.
Key words: Fiscal policy, Debt, Sustainability, Financial crises, Sweden. 
JEL: E02, E61, E62, E65.
 
 
 
 
The Great Recession that followed in the steps of the global financial crisis that 
started in the US in 2007 has had a devastating impact on the public finances in most 
European economies. Rescue programs in addition to expansionary fiscal policies to 
counteract the effects of the crisis have increased budget deficits and debt ratios to 
levels that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. The p attern that finan-
cial crises tend to generate sovereign debt crises is not new, however, as recently 
shown by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010). Rising deficits and 
debt tend to follow after most financial crises. The current crisis nevertheless demon-
strates how quickly a financial crisis may develop into a sovereign debt crisis. In 
Europe the crisis is so serious that it even threatens the foundation of the European 
Union (EU) project and the euro as a currency. 
In some European countries, for example in Greece, the fiscal crisis has de-
veloped into a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis. There is a well-founded fear among 
investors as well as policymakers that the Greek debt crisis could spread to other 
euro-zone countries. As the crisis in Greece unfolds, investors may start worry about 
other European countries, in particular countries where the banking sector hold EU 
governments’ debt and countries with similar levels of debt and deficits. To some 
extent, this has already happened, government bond prices have fallen significantly 
and market interest rates including interest rates on CDS contracts have increased in 
many countries, for example, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
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As a response to the acute debt crisis in Greece, the EU countries agreed to 
create a new mechanism that could provide financial support to euro-zone member 
countries in financial difficulties, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
EFSF is backed by a guarantee from the euro-zone member countries for a total of 
€780 billion and it has a lending capacity of €440 billion and issues bonds or other 
debt instruments on the capital markets. Another mechanism, the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), was also created in 2010. This mechanism pro-
vides financial assistance to EU member states in financial distress and is backed by 
an implicit EU budget guarantee. On behalf of the EU, the EU Commission can bor-
row up to €60 billion on the capital market. Ireland and Portugal have received fi-
nancial support from this mechanism, €22.5 billion for Ireland and €26 billion for 
Portugal. When this paper is written, three euro-zone countries (Italy, Ireland and 
Portugal) and one EU country (Hungary) have requested financial support from In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU. A number of EU countries either had their 
credit ratings downgraded (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) or 
have been given warnings of possible future downgrading (France and Hungary) by 
various credit rating agencies.  
That the situation in Europe and in the EMU countries is severe may best be 
illustrated by the fact that most countries (24 out of 27 in 2010) have budget deficits 
exceeding the 3 percent reference value and debt ratios exceeding the 60 percent 
limit stipulated by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In order to illustrate the re-
cent developments of public finances in EU, Figure 1 compares debt ratios (govern-
ment debt as a share of GDP) and budget deficits (net lending as a share of GDP) in 
2007 and in 2011. The data has been downloaded from AMECO, an annual macro-
economic database of the European Commission's Directorate General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). A 45-degree line has been added to the graph. 
Countries appearing to the right and below this line have higher debt level (or lower 
net borrowing) in 2011 compared to 2007. Looking first at the graph on the left hand 
side showing debt ratios. It is clear from this graph that debt ratios in most European 
countries have increased during the last four years, in some cases dramatically so. 
There are, however, a few countries that can be found close to or on the 45-degree 
line, for example Sweden, Estonia and Bulgaria, where debt levels have been almost 
constant over time. At the other extreme we find Greece where the debt ratio has in-
creased from 105 percent to 157 percent and Ireland where the debt ratio has in-
creased from 25 percent to 112 percent. 
The right hand side graph in Figure 1 illustrates the change in net lending over  
the same time period. It is evident from this graph that almost all EU countries (3 out  
of 27 countries) complied with the SGP requirement that net lending should not ex- 
ceed 3 percent in 2007. The situation in 2011 is completely different, most countries  
breach the 3 percent limit (20 out of 27). The two graphs clearly illustrate how   
quickly the fiscal position can change, from close to surplus to large deficits over a  
four-year period. The few exceptions from this rule are of interest. How can it be that  
some countries manage to balance public finances during a global financial crisis? In  
this regard, Sweden is an interesting case. Sweden was severely hit by the financial  
crisis. For example, real GDP fell by around one-half percent in 2007 and by over  
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Source: Ameco database.
 
Figure 1  Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP and Net Lending as a Percentage of GDP in EU 
Countries 2007 and 2011 
 
five percent in 2009. Unemployment has increased by over three percentage points 
since 2007 and exports fell by over sixteen percent in 2009. Despite these negative 
impulses, Sweden still has had net lending surpluses since 2005. Given this excep-
tional performance, the Swedish case has attracted considerable international interest 
recently. The Swedish minister of finance, Anders Borg, was named European fi-
nance minister of the year by the Financial Times in their latest ranking of finance 
ministers in Europe. The question is how this exceptional performance of public fi-
nances in Sweden can be explained. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this 
question. I suggest that the currently strong public finances in Sweden can be ex-
plained by two main factors. First, Sweden entered the crisis with strong public fi-
nances and second that unemployment did not rise as much as normally when GDP  
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fall. One may argue that the current crisis only has had minor influence on the Swed-
ish economy and that in turn would explain why public finances have not been 
strongly affected. This is not the case. I compare the macroeconomic behavior during 
the current crisis and during the banking crisis in the early 1990s and show that the 
current crisis has been more severe for the Swedish economy compared to the bank-
ing crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 I briefly de-
scribe the macroeconomic development and the behavior of public finances during 
the last decades. Then, in Section 2, I compare the economic development during the 
current crisis with the banking crisis in the 1990s. Section 3 describes the Swedish 
fiscal policy framework. In Section 4 I ask the question whether the fiscal policy 
framework has had an effect on public finances. Section 5 analyzes why public fi-
nances are so strong in Sweden. Section 6 summarizes the main findings.  
 
1. Macroeconomic Development during the Crisis 
 
Recessions, i.e., drops in GDP, are rare episodes in most countries, so also for Swe-
den. During the post-World War II period, there are only four episodes including the 
current financial crisis; 1977, 1981, 1991-1993 and in 2008-2009 as can be seen in 
Figure 2 showing real GDP growth in Sweden since 1961. These four episodes stand 
out as exceptions from the general pattern with fairly high economic growth. Look-
ing more closely at the growth rates, one notes that there seems to a pattern of slower 
growth followed by somewhat higher growth, i.e., cyclical fluctuations. In addition, 
the graph illustrates the asymmetry between expansions and contractions where the 
latter appear briefer than the former. Comparing the depth of contractions we also 
note that the fall in GDP during the current crisis even exceeds the fall during the 
banking crisis in the early 1990s. This is a surprising finding. In Sweden, the general 
opinion holds that the banking crisis in the early 1990s was an exceptional and one-
time event. The current fall in real GDP is also exceptional in a historical perspec-
tive. There are only very few occasions when real GDP growth fell more than it did 
during the current crisis. There are only three other episodes of falling real GDP 
growth of the same magnitude during the last 100 years, 1917-1918, 1921 and 1940. 
For comparison, during the crisis in the 1930s, real GDP fell by 3.1 percent. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008) identify the Swedish banking crisis as one of the five most catas-
trophic episodes in the postwar period with major declines in economic performance 
over a long period of time. The other four banking crises they identify are Spain in 
1977, Norway in 1987, Finland in 1991 and Japan 1992. 
 Figure 3 showing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) estimates of the Swedish output gap illustrates again the dramatic falls 
in economic activity during the current crisis and during the banking crisis. The 
graph also shows that the fall in the output gap fell more rapidly and to lower levels 
during the current crisis compared to during the banking crisis. The general picture 
emerging from Figures 2 and 3 is that the decline in economic activity during the 
current crisis exceeds the decline during the banking crisis. 
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Source: Ameco.
 
Figure 2  Real GDP Growth in Sweden 1961-2010 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD.
 
Figure 3  GDP-Gap in Sweden 1980-2010 
  
 
In Figure 4 we show how total government net lending and the primary bal-
ance have developed since the beginning of the 1980s. The buildup of government 
debt during the 1980s as is also illustrated in Figure 5 showing government debt as a 
percentage of GDP. When the banking crisis hit the Swedish economy, government 
debt had declined somewhat, from slightly above 60 percent in 1984 to around 41 
percent in 1990. During the 1990s, government increased as a result of the deep re-
cession that followed in the aftermath of the banking crisis together with costs related 
to the attempts to rescue the banking sector. The net lending deficit was over 6 per-
cent of GDP in 1994 and 1995. Over the period 1989 until mid 1992 the budget defi-
cit as a percentage of GDP fell from a surplus of 3.3 percent in the fourth quarter of  
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1989 to a deficit of 11.4 percent in the second quarter of 1993. Over the same period 
government debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 45 percent to over 76 per-
cent. 
 
 
 
Source: Ameco.
 
Figure 4  Net Lending and Primary Balance as a Percentage of GDP in Sweden 1980-2010 
  
 
 
 
Source: Ameco.
 
Figure 5  Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP in Sweden 1970-2010 
 
The fall in output was accompanied by deteriorations on the labor market. Un-
employment has risen by slightly more than three percentage points since the last 
quarter of 2007. Unemployment was 5.9 percent in the first quarter of 2008 and 
peaked at 8.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2009. Then unemployment declined 
somewhat in 2010 and was 7.3 per cent during the third quarter of 2011. Employ-
ment followed the same general pattern as unemployment. Labor force participation 
rate has remained fairly constant during the crisis, around 71 percent since year 2000.  
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Employment declined from 76 percent in the first quarter of 2008 to 73 percent in the 
fourth quarter of 2009. Since then, employment has been steadily increasing. It is 
noteworthy that the entire decline in the number of persons employed since 2008 had 
been recouped in March 2011. However, the employment rate is still lower than in 
2007, in the first quarter of 2011 it was 75 percent. 
 
2. Comparing the Current Crisis and the Crisis in Early 1990’s 
 
In this section we compare the development of the Swedish economy during the 
banking crisis in the early 1990s with the current crisis in more detail, see for exam-
ple Stefan Ingves and Goran Lind (1996), Peter Englund (1999) and Lars Jonung, 
Jaakko Kiander, and Pentti Vartia (2009) for an analysis of the causes, consequences 
and the resolution of the Swedish banking crisis. As in the previous section we focus 
on the main picture, i.e., GDP, unemployment, and exports. The reason why we also 
compare exports is that the dramatic fall in GDP, to a large extent, can be explained 
by declines in exports, see Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2010). 
The decline in nominal GDP over the past year has been uniquely large as was 
also illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 above. In Figure 6 we compare the developments 
of GDP 4 quarter prior to the outbreak of the crisis (1990 first quarter and 2008 first 
quarter, respectively) and 16 quarters after this event. Note that the last three obser-
vations of GDP (2011 third quarter until 2012 first quarter) are forecasts provided by 
the National Institute of Economic Research. We normalize GDP to 100 at the out-
break of the two crises in order to make comparisons clearer. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 6, GDP fell by six per cent from the first quarter of 2008 to the last quarter of 
2009. The current economic downturn has unfolded more dramatically than the crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Index = 100 the first quarter of 1990 and 2008, respectively. 
Source: National Institute of Economic Research.
 
Figure 6  GDP Developments during the Current Crisis Compared with the 1990s Crisis  
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in the 1990s. Then it took three years from the cyclical peak before GDP had fallen 
by five per cent. During the current crisis GDP fell more violently and it reached its 
trough after only 4 quarters. After the trough GDP increased and returned to its pre-
crisis level after 10 quarters. After the banking crisis GDP increased slowly and 
gradually and was still below its pre-crisis level after 4 years. The current crisis un-
folded quickly and violently but was fairly short-lived. 
Next, we turn to unemployment. Figure 7 shows the development of unem-
ployment before and after the outbreak of the two crises. As above when studying 
GDP, we normalize unemployment in this case to 0 at the outbreak of the two crises. 
Unemployment has increased more during the previous crisis. Unemployment then 
rose by ten percentage points from 1990 to 1994. The labor market has deteriorated 
sharply in the wake of the exceptionally strong slowdown in output and demand dur-
ing the current crisis. From the last quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2009, unem-
ployment rose by almost three percentage points, which is about the same as in the 
first two years of the crisis in the 1990s. Despite the similarities in the early part of 
the crisis, labor market developments have been much less dramatic than during the 
banking crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Unemployment the first quarter of 1990 and 2008 are normalized to 0. The graph shows the change in unemployment from 
this quarter in percentage points. 
Source: National Institute of Economic Research.
 
Figure 7  Unemployment Developments during the Current Crisis Compared with the 1990s Crisis 
 
The difference between the current crisis and the banking crisis is striking. 
Employment has begun to increase again in recent quarters. The fall in employment 
was both greater and more persistent in the 1990s. The employment rate fell twelve 
percentage points from 1991 to 1994, and never returned to the levels prevailing 
prior to that crisis. Labor force participation has fallen considerably less than it did  
439  Best in Class: Public Finances in Sweden during the Financial Crisis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 4, pp. 431-453
during the corresponding time in the previous crisis. In relation to the very different 
responses of GDP during the two crises it seems that there is no stable relationship 
between GDP growth and employment as has been suggested by Okun’s law. Indeed, 
estimates of Okun’s law for Swedish data suggest that the relation is very different 
during contractions, in particular during the banking crisis and the current crisis, see 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2010). They show that employment fell considerably 
more during the first part of the banking crisis than normally. The fall in employment 
from the first quarter of 1991 to the second quarter of 1993 was more than one per-
centage point greater than what it would have during normal times. By contrast, em-
ployment fell considerably less during the recent crisis than it would have during 
normal times. In particular, during the last two quarters of 2009 the deviation is 1.4 
and 3.2 percentage points respectively. 
How should we interpret these differences? First of all there is a difference 
since the crises and the mechanisms behind the crises were different. Aggregate de-
mand remained very strong during the recent crisis while exports fell sharply (see 
Figure 8 below). The fall in employment in the manufacturing sector was to a large 
extent offset by increases in employment in the service sector, which is labor inten-
sive. Secondly, there have been various structural reforms on the labor market and 
there have been an attempt to increase the effectiveness of labor market policies. The 
implementation of an earned income tax credit may also have contributed. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Index = 100 the first quarter of 1990 and 2008, respectively. 
Source: Ecowin.
 
Figure 8  Exports Developments during the Current Crisis Compared with the 1990s Crisis 
 
Finally we consider the behavior of exports during the two crises. We illus-
trate and compare exports developments in the same way as we studied GDP above. 
We normalize exports to 100 in the first quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 2008  
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and show the developments four quarters prior to the crises and 16 quarters after the 
crises. Note that we only have data for the first 13 quarters after the most recent cri-
sis. During the banking crisis, exports remained fairly constant but at a somewhat 
lower level and then started to increase sharply after 12 quarters (in the first quarter 
of 1993). The pattern during the recent crisis is quite different. Exports fell rapidly 
during 2008 and reached its trough in the first quarter of 2009 and then started to 
increase slowly. In the first quarter of 2011 exports returned to its pre-crisis level. 
One explanation to this very different development is that the Swedish currency de-
preciated considerably after the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate in Novem-
ber 1992. The nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by about 12 percent dur-
ing 1993 and further 9 percent during 1994 whereas it depreciated by 12 percent dur-
ing 2008 but appreciated by 4 percent during 2009. 
Comparing the developments during the two crises we find a larger drop in 
GDP and in exports while unemployment increased less during the recent crisis. The 
absence of large increases in unemployment explains why public finances did not 
deteriorate as much during the recent crisis as it did during the banking crisis. The 
underlying reason for this is that aggregate demand remained strong during the recent 
crisis and the fact that increases in employment in the service sector did offset lower 
employment in the manufacturing sector. Another contributing factor may have been 
the Swedish fiscal framework that has been in place since the banking crisis in the 
1990s. In the next section we briefly describe the fiscal framework and then in the 
following section we answer the question if the fiscal framework has lead to a sig-
nificantly shift in the developments of public finances. 
 
3. The Swedish Fiscal Framework 
 
The financial crisis in Sweden during the early 1990s constituted a major shift in 
both macroeconomic policy in general and the institutional framework in particular, 
see Urban Hansson-Brusewitz and Yngve Lindh (2005) and Peter Claeys (2008) for 
recent analyzes of the Swedish fiscal framework. Sweden had prior to and during the 
banking crisis a fixed exchange rate regime where the currency was fixed against a 
basket of currencies where the weights were given by the trade weights of its major 
trading partners. The banking crisis that hit the Swedish economy in the beginning of 
the 1990’s quickly transformed into a currency crisis and the Swedish central bank 
(the Riksbank) and the government were both determined to uphold the exchange 
rate regime while at the same time trying to resolve the banking crisis. The policy 
failed and there was a tremendous pressure on the exchange rate and finally the 
Riksbank had to abandon the fixed exchange rate on November 19, 1992. The gov-
ernment and the Riksbank had to reconsider the institutional framework for monetary 
policy and in January 1993 Sweden became the fourth country to introduce an infla-
tion target that was made statutory in 1999. The monetary policy framework also 
stipulated that monetary policy should take output gap, unemployment into account 
when designing the policy but these goals are considered as only secondary. Finan-
cial stability meaning securing a stable system of payments was also introduced as 
secondary goals. Later the Riksbank itself has widened this to also include financial 
stability in the same way as many other central banks have done. The new monetary  
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policy framework has been successful. Inflation has been reduced and has fluctuated 
closely around the target. This is in sharp contrast to the very high and persistent in-
flation rates in the Swedish economy during the 1980s.  
The financial crisis and the policies implemented to resolve the banking crisis 
lead to a sharp increase in budget deficits and government debt and it was deemed 
necessary to implement a budget consolidation when the acute crisis was resolved. 
As a part of the budget consolidation it was decided to introduce a new fiscal policy 
framework, see Ministry of Finance (2011) for a detailed description of the frame-
work. The goal of fiscal policy is to maintain fiscal stability as formulated in the new 
fiscal framework that was motivated and built upon the experiences from the banking 
crisis. The main objective of fiscal policy in Sweden is to attain fiscal stability and 
the framework consists of four main parts, a balanced budget requirement for mu-
nicipalities and county councils, an expenditure ceiling for the central government, a 
top-down budget process where expenditures limits are established first and then the 
government allocates expenditures within this limit to individual budget areas, and a 
surplus target for the entire public sector. 
The balanced budget requirement on local governments was introduced in 
2000 and implies that every local government must plan for a balanced budget but 
are allowed to budget for a temporary deficit under special circumstances. Such spe-
cial circumstances include situations when the financial position is strong or if out-
lays one budget year involves costs that have lasting effects on the budgets the next 
year or years. Examples of such costs are cost cutting effects in next years budget or 
if budget deficits are due to unforeseen special events such as large losses on asset 
holdings. If budget deficits would occur, these should be corrected within three 
years. It should also be emphasized that the balanced budget requirement is a mini-
mum requirement, in general local governments are required to practice what is 
called sound economic management (equivalent to a 2 percent surplus). The govern-
ment conducts surveillance over the financial situation and local governments are 
required to submit an annual report to the government. 
The second part of the fiscal framework is an expenditure ceiling for govern-
ment outlays that was introduced in 1997 and made statutory in 2009. This ceiling is 
decided by the parliament (the Riksdag) for at least three years ahead and refers to all 
central government expenditures except interest payments on government debt. In 
practice the government presents a proposal each year on the expenditure ceiling 
three years ahead and then the parliament decides. The expenditure ceiling includes a 
budget margin (a safety margin) to be used in case there are large unexpected 
changes in government revenue. The idea is to provide space for newly decided ex-
penditures as well as for automatic expenditure increases in case there is a downturn 
in the economy. 
When the total outlay has been decided, the government then allocates to indi-
vidual expenditures, which is the third pillar, a top-down budget process. This budget 
process requires that the sum of all budget proposals lie within the total expenditure 
ceiling creating a clear distinction between the total size of the budget and the com-
position of expenditures. As mentioned above, the expenditure ceiling also includes a 
budget margin. This budget margin is defined and decided by the government using  
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the guideline that the should be 1 percent for the current year (year t), 1.5 per cent for 
year t+1, 2 per cent for year t+2 and 3 per cent for year t+3. 
It is important to note that the expenditure ceiling complements and supports 
the surplus target, which is the fourth pillar of the fiscal framework. The surplus tar-
get was approved by the Riksdag in 1996 and has been fully implemented since 
2000. Since 2010 it is a statutory requirement for the Government to propose a sur-
plus target for general government net lending. Under the recent Budget Act, the 
government shall propose a surplus target for general government net lending and 
then the Riksdag decides. It is important to note that the term surplus target may be 
misleading. Nothing in the fiscal framework or in the Budget Act requires that the 
target must be a surplus in general government net lending. The target could be bal-
ance or a deficit depending on the economic developments and the level of govern-
ment debt. The term surplus target was first used when it was introduced in 1996 
probably since it was decided that the target was a surplus. Today it is a well-
established term in the Swedish society even if it may be misleading. The current 
decision by the Riksdag is that the surplus target should be maintained during the 
current governments term of office and for as long as is deemed necessary for public 
finances to be long-term sustainable. The target was initially set to 2 percent but 
when Eurostat in 2007 decided that saving in the premium pension system could no 
longer be included in financial saving, the surplus target was technically adjusted, 
from 2 to 1 percent of GDP.  
The surplus target is evaluated using mainly forward-looking indicators and is 
used in order to assess the scope of reform or as an indicator suggesting future con-
solidation measures. A potential problem with the definition of the surplus target is 
that it refers to an average over the business cycle. Since the business cycle cannot be 
measured precisely there is a need for measurable alternative indicators. These indi-
cators are discussed in detail in the next section. 
It is of course impossible to evaluate the surplus target without uncertainty and 
there is a risk that actual developments deviate from the forecast of future general 
government net lending. Furthermore, when using structural measures of net lending 
and potential GDP there are several other measurement errors that could potentially 
affect the forward-looking indicators making them obsolete. On the other hand, the 
government is only using the different indicators as guidelines taking uncertainty into 
account. If indicators suggest a future deviation from the surplus target they have to 
be corrected. How a deviation is to be corrected has to be based on an overall as-
sessment taking into account stabilization, redistribution and structural policy objec-
tives. 
The fiscal framework is monitored both according to the rules laid out in the 
Stability and Growth Pact (submission of convergence reports) and by national bod-
ies including the National Financial Management Authority, the National Audit Of-
fice, the Fiscal Policy Council and the National Institute of Economic Research. Each 
of these has specific responsibilities but is also allowed to focus on all aspects of fis-
cal policy and the long-run sustainability of public finances. 
It is also noteworthy that the Swedish government provides a declaration of 
the principles governing the use of monetary and fiscal policy for stabilization pur- 
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poses. The government declares first that under normal circumstances, monetary pol-
icy is the primary means of stabilizing fluctuations in the Swedish economy. Fiscal 
policy should only be used in case the economy is hit by severe disturbances. If an 
active fiscal policy is used, the government says that measures must be designed in 
such a way that net lending will convert to the surplus target when the economic 
situation has returned to its normal state. Therefore it is argued that only temporary 
measures should be used in order to stabilize the economy. Permanent measures, if 
they are used at all, should contribute to permanently higher economic growth and 
higher long-term employment. This suggests that the surplus target is viewed as the 
most important pillar of the fiscal framework.  
 
4. Does the Institutional Framework Work? 
 
The most important instrument for steering fiscal policy in Sweden is, as has been 
argued above, the surplus target, i.e., that general government net lending should be 
one percent of GDP over a business cycle. Since it is difficult to determine the peaks 
and troughs of business cycles, the Government has decided to use five different in-
dicators when evaluating the surplus target. These are backward- and forward-
looking averages of actual and structural net lending. In practice it seems that the 
Government puts more emphasis on structural net lending, i.e., the fiscal balance in a 
balanced state of the business cycle. There are, however, a number of reasons why 
this may not be the optimal indicator, for example difficulties when adjusting for 
automatic stabilizers and when computing the GDP gap. The impact of automatic 
stabilizers may vary over the business cycle implying that the adjustment is sensitive 
to actual cyclical swings. The GDP gap is the deviation of GDP from potential GDP. 
There are several different methods available to compute potential GDP. For exam-
ple, the National Institute of Economic Research uses one method whereas OECD is 
using a different method. The average of the GDP gap for Sweden commonly used is 
negative on average implying that the gap is defined as the GDP level compatible 
with a constant rate of inflation. Since inflation is more flexible upwards than down-
wards, it implies that the Riksbank must pursue a monetary policy that results in a 
negative GDP gap on average if inflation should be kept around the inflation target. 
However, such a measure of the GDP gap is not optimal when estimating structural 
net lending. It is no surprise then that the general conclusion from the Governments 
own evaluations that the surplus target is met. In the ten-year period 2000-2009, av-
erage net lending was 1.3 per cent of GDP. In the coming years, net lending is ex-
pected to be 0.3 percent in 2011 and then gradually increase the next coming years. 
According to the 2011 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill all indicators suggest that the surplus 
target will be met with a good margin. This conclusion is also supported by estimates 
of the so called S2-indicator which measures the permanent change in net lending as 
a percentage of GDP necessary to comply with the intertemporal budget constraint. 
According to this measure, public finances in Sweden are long-term sustainable. 
Since the surplus target is formulated in terms of variation over the business 
cycle it would be interesting to first date the Swedish business cycle and then evalu-
ate the surplus target. Such an approach provides an alternative to the use of different 
indicators for example the ones currently used by the government when evaluating  
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the surplus target. Michael U. Bergman (2011) dates the Swedish business cycle us-
ing several different methods and using the two established definitions of a business 
cycle, i.e., growth cycles or classical business cycles. It is noteworthy that different 
measures and methods seem to suggest very similar dating. The dating of peaks and 
troughs is not very sensitive to the particular method used. A business cycle can be 
measured either from one trough to the next or from one peak to the next. Using this 
dating we can evaluate the surplus target. Furthermore, since the surplus target was 
introduced in 1996 but was not used prior to 2000 it allows us to compare and con-
trast the behavior of net lending prior to and after the implementation of the surplus 
target. 
Table 1 shows the average of general government net lending as a share of 
GDP during each business cycle since 1970. Business cycles are measured either as 
growth cycles (deviation from a trend) or as classical cycles. We also distinguish 
between business cycles measured from either trough-to-trough or from peak-to-
peak. An interesting question is whether the introduction of the surplus target has 
constituted a trend break or not. Since the measurement of the Swedish business cy-
cle is somewhat dependent on the method used to date the cycle we report results for 
both definitions of the business cycles. The pattern that emerges in table 1 is that the 
general government net lending during business cycles prior to 1996 well exceeds the 
current surplus target. On average, the general government net lending was negative 
over the business cycles until mid 1990s. There are very few periods or business cy-
cles where the surplus target was fulfilled as can be seen in the table. 
 
Table 1   General Government Net Lending as a Share of GDP during Swedish Business Cycles 
1970-2010 
 
  Business cycle  Classical cycle  Business cycle  Growth cycle 
Peak-to-peak  1971-1975 4.5 1970-1976  4.8 
  1975-1979 1.9 1976-1980  -0.2 
  1979-1984 -4.7 1980-1990  -1.5 
  1984-1990 0.9 1990-1995  -5.5 
 1990-1997  -4.8     
Average   -0.4    -0.6 
  2000-2007 1.3 2000-2008  1.4 
Trough-to-trough 1972-1977 4.3 1972-1977  4.3 
  1978-1981 -3.5 1977-1983  -3.4 
  1981-1985 -4.6 1983-1993  -1.7 
  1986-1993 -0.9 1993-1997  -6.5 
 1993-1997  -6.5     
Average   -2.2    -1.8 
  1997-2003 0.4 1997-2003  0.4 
  2003-2009 1.2 2003-2009  1.2 
 
Note: Classical cycle denotes business cycles computed using a Markov Switching model as suggested by James D. Ham-
ilton (1989) and Growth cycle denotes the business cycle computed using filtering techniques such as the HP-filter and 
different band-pass filters. The table reports averages of general government net lending as a share of GDP during one 
business cycle. 
Source: Tables 6 and 7 in Bergman (2011). 
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We also find that the surplus target has been fulfilled during the most recent 
period. It is likely that the introduction of the fiscal framework has contributed to 
long-term sustainable public finances. At the same time it is important to remember 
that both the 1970s and the 1980s were characterized by several international and 
national crises that may explain the deterioration of public finances during these dec-
ades. The oil price shocks during the 1970s and early 1980s had a strong negative 
impact on the world economy and also on the Swedish economy. The overheated 
Swedish economy during the second half of the 1980s caused the Swedish banking 
crisis in the early 1990s and generated the large budget deficits and an increasing 
government debt. However, the initial condition in early 1970s is very similar to the 
current situation with a long period of high economic growth and stable public fi-
nances. As can be seen in Table 1, Sweden had a general government net lending 
surplus prior to the first oil price shock in 1973-74 (OPEC I). 
When the first oil price shock hit the world economy, public finances deterio-
rated quickly. The immediate policy response in Sweden was an expansionary fiscal 
policy with the goal of overthrowing the recession that was expected to follow after 
the oil price shock. The result was a cost crisis caused by too large wage increases 
that was met by repeated devaluations. The crisis started in 1979 when the world 
economy was hit by the second oil price shock that again was met by repeated de-
valuations in 1981 and in 1982. These devaluations only had a temporary effect. The 
liberalization of the Swedish credit markets towards the end of the 1980s contributed 
to a boom that finally was followed by the banking crisis in the beginning of the 
1990s. This general pattern of consecutive international and national crises illustrates 
that even if the initial fiscal position is strong it is not unlikely that public finances 
deteriorates quickly when the economy is hit by a negative shock or consecutive 
negative shocks. In the end, budget deficits may be too large and public finances will 
cease to be long-term sustainable. As was mentioned in the introduction, this pattern 
is not new or unique it is a general pattern during boom-bust cycles. A financial crisis 
very often transforms into a sovereign debt crisis. 
The conclusion from this analysis is that the surplus target has been satisfied 
since it was introduced in year 2000. It is also remarkable that the behavior of net 
lending has changed considerably over time and it is tempting to interpret the empiri-
cal evidence as support for the idea that the fiscal framework is important and can 
lead to improved public finances. However, an alternative interpretation is that after 
the banking crisis there was a general consensus among economists as well as the 
government and parliament to introduce more discipline in fiscal policies. To further 
strengthen the framework, the expenditure ceiling as well as the surplus target is now 
statutory. Regardless of how we interpret the evidence it is clear that the combination 
of the fiscal framework and the political consensus has had a strong influence on the 
development of public finances in Sweden. This is also illustrated by the political 
support for the other components of the fiscal framework such as the expenditure 
ceiling. 
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5. Why are the Public Finances so Strong in Sweden?  
 
In previous sections we have compared the macroeconomic behavior during the re-
cent crisis with the one during the banking crisis in early 1990s and we have evalu-
ated the surplus target using a more direct method. Our analysis suggests that even 
though GDP fell more during the recent crisis, employment has remained high and 
did not fall as much as it did during the earlier crisis whereas exports fell more and 
remain at a fairly low level compared to the almost constant level of exports during 
the banking crisis. At the same time we noted that the banking crisis lead to large 
budget deficits, the deficit in net lending was around 6 percent of GDP during a three 
year period during the first half of the 1990s. The difference between the banking 
crisis and the recent crisis is striking. Sweden has had budget surplus since 2005, the 
average surplus is 1.7 percent of GDP until 2010. This can be compared to the aver-
age budget deficit in EU-27 of 3.45 percent and 3.2 in both EU-17 and EU-12. The 
question is whether this remarkable difference is due to stronger initial position of 
public finances or differences in the development during the crisis. 
To illustrate we present in Table 2 a decomposition of the difference in net 
borrowing in 2010 and in 2007 between Sweden and both EU-27 and the euro-zone 
(EU-17). In the table we decompose the differences in net borrowing into different 
factors, the difference in initial position in 2007 and the expected change in net bor-
rowing in Sweden if the Swedish net lending would have weakened in line with the 
average EU-27 or euro-zone country. Using data for the EU countries we estimate 
the relationship between the change in net lending over the period 2007 and 2009 on 
a constant and the fall in nominal GDP between 2008 and 2009. This gives us an av-
erage relationship between changes in net lending and the fall in GDP that then can 
be used to compare the implied fall in net lending in Sweden if its net lending had 
declined in relation to the average decline in EU-27 (and in the original euro-zone 
countries). The deficit in government net lending as a percentage of GDP was 6.8 
percentage points lower in Sweden than in the EU-27 in 2010, see Table 2. Out of 
these 6.8 percentage points, 4.5 are explained by higher net lending before the crisis 
in 2007. If net lending had weakened in line with the average relation with GDP for 
the EU countries net lending in Sweden would have been about the same as in EU. 
Instead, net lending decreased by 2.23 percentage points less in Sweden than it 
would if Sweden had followed the average relation with GDP in EU. Similar conclu-
sion holds also if we compare to the euro-zone as can be seen in Table 2. The conclu-
sion is that the reason why Swedish public finances remained strong during the crisis 
was both a stronger position before the crisis and a better development during the 
crisis. 
What can explain the fact that public finances did not deteriorate as much in 
Sweden as in other European countries? The main reason is that employment fell 
considerably less than normally, i.e., during periods where GDP fall. This is dis-
cussed in detail in Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2011) where they compare the 
trends in GDP and government net lending in a select number of OECD countries. 
The reaction of Sweden’s public finances to the cyclical developments was relatively 
limited. In general, public finances deteriorated more in countries that experienced 
relatively large decreases in GDP. The fall in GDP was larger in Sweden than in 
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Table 2   Differences in Government Net Borrowing 2010 between Sweden and EU-27 and between 
Sweden and EU-17 as a Share of GDP 
 
  EU-27 EU-17 
Difference in net borrowing in 2010  6.80  6.48 
of which    
Difference in net borrowing in 2007  4.50  4.30 
Difference in contribution from fall in GDP  0,07  0.20 
Residual 2.23  1.98 
 
Source: Ameco, Eurostat and own calculations. 
 
 
OECD (and in EU-27 as well as EU-17). At the same time they find a significantly 
better development in public finances than in OECD. An interesting observation they 
make is that the deterioration of net lending in Greece and Portugal was less than the 
average in OECD countries. A possible conclusion is that the current large deficits in 
these countries mainly are due to large initial deficits in net lending. Entering a fi-
nancial crisis with budget deficits is not a good position to start with. Those countries 
can be compared to countries such as Sweden that entered the global financial crisis 
with public finances in good shape. For example, net lending fell considerably more 
in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Slovakia than in Sweden, even though the decrease 
in GDP in these countries was about the same as in Sweden. 
When comparing the current crisis with the banking crisis in the 1990s we 
found that net lending deficits were small during the current crisis compared with the 
earlier crisis. Even though GDP fell more in 2008/09 than in 1991-1993, government 
net lending decreased 3.4 percentage points from 2007 to 2010, whereas it decreased 
almost 15 percentage points from 1990 to 1993. This may indicate that public fi-
nances have become less cyclically sensitive. One possible reason may be that public 
expenditure now amounts to about 50 per cent of GDP compared to about 60 per cent 
in the early 1990s suggesting that the automatic stabilizers have become weaker. An-
other contributing factor may be the earned income tax credits and reduced benefits 
levels in unemployment insurance that have recently been introduced. In Sweden 
unemployment benefits are set in nominal terms and are very seldom adjusted for 
inflation. The current ceiling of the maximum unemployment benefits was set in the 
beginning of 2000, for example. This implies that the real value of the benefit falls 
over time and since wages tend to increase more than inflation it follows that the 
maximum benefit as well as the basic benefit falls as percentage of average wages. 
Another important factor is that the 1990s crisis differed in character from the current 
crisis. The earlier crisis was a domestic financial crisis whereas the current crisis is 
global.  
Despite the larger fall in GDP growth in the current crisis, employment fell 
less than the historical pattern would suggest. For example, during the last two quar-
ters of 2009 the deviation is 1.4 and 3.2 percentage points respectively. One possible 
explanation for this difference is that the mechanisms behind the crises are different. 
During the Swedish banking crisis domestic demand fell whereas it has been rela-
tively strong during the current crisis. Employment in the service sector has remained  
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high because of this. Even though exports fell sharply during the current crisis ex-
plaining the large drop in GDP growth and in the output gap, employment remained 
relatively high in the export sector. The general pattern is that the fall in employment 
during the current crisis can be explained by a fall in employment in the manufactur-
ing industry, other sectors were largely unaffected. During the crisis in the 1990s 
employment fell sharply in all sectors. Partly explaining this difference is the strong 
public finances reducing the risk of contractions in employment in the public sector. 
During the 1990s crisis public employment fell, employment in the health care and 
social services fell by almost 14 percent over the period 1990-97 for example.  
There are also other possible explanations including structural reforms on the 
labor market as well as improved and more effective labor market policies and the 
newly implemented earned income tax reductions and tax reductions on household-
related services (cleaning, maintenance, laundry) and for Repairs, Maintenance and 
Improvements (RMI). The tax reduction on household services was introduced in 
2007 whereas the RMI tax reduction was introduced in the end of 2008. The tax re-
duction is 50 percent of the labor cost up to a maximum of SEK 50 thousand per year 
and per person. It is likely that the improved labor market policies and structural re-
forms have at least not increased the risk of becoming unemployed whereas the tax 
reductions on household services and positively affected the service sector during 
normal times. Even though the tax reductions are permanent it may be that house-
holds perceived the tax reduction to be only temporary and therefore used these ser-
vices earlier than they otherwise would do. Supporting this argument is that the ac-
tual costs of the tax reduction exceed what was forecasted. The total gross cost in the 
form of reduced tax revenue (without taking into account the likely positive effects 
on employment and thus on the tax base) is about SEK 70 billion. The credit has 
been introduced in four steps. This has resulted in tax cuts on earned income every 
year of the current government’s term of office. The total costs in the form of re-
duced tax revenue (static costs without taking into account the effects on hours 
worked) come to about SEK 70 billion, of which the first step in 2007 represented 
about SEK 40 billion and each of the three subsequent steps about SEK 10 billion. 
Earned income tax credits are very common internationally, but the Swedish 
earned income tax credit differs, however, from corresponding credits in most other 
countries in so far as it is paid to everyone who works regardless of how high their 
earned income is making it relatively costly. Only two other countries, Denmark and 
the Netherlands, have the same design. The direct budget cost – without taking into 
account that the cost of other social benefits decreases and tax revenue increases to 
the extent that the objective of getting more people in work is achieved – comes to 
about 2.3 percent of GDP in Sweden, while in most other countries, it is in the inter-
val 0.3-0.5 percent of GDP. The country closest to Sweden in direct budget costs is 
the Netherlands with about 1.6 percent of GDP. 
Employment growth in recent years says very little about the long-term effects 
of the earned income tax credit. The credit would mainly be expected to affect equi-
librium employment, that is, average employment over the business cycle. In the 
short run, employment developments are mainly determined by cyclical swings in 
aggregate demand. Possible effects of the earned income tax credit in the last two  
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years have most likely been overwhelmed by recent years’ dramatic cyclical devel-
opments. 
To sum up. The main reason why public finances in Sweden did not deterio-
rate to the same extent as in many other European countries is that the initial position 
was much better. Sweden has had net lending surpluses since 2005. In addition, the 
development during the crisis is also better than in the EU even though GDP fell 
more than on average in EU and in the euro-zone. The explanation is that unem-
ployment did not rise as much as expected which is quite different from the experi-
ence from the banking crisis in the 1990s as was illustrated in Figure 7. One possible 
interpretation is that there is a lot of labor hoarding in the Swedish economy during 
the recent crisis. Businesses decided to retain workers in order to ensure that their 
core competencies were still available when the economy turned upwards. Why had 
Sweden a better initial position in public finances? There are two possible explana-
tions, either that the lessons learned from the earlier banking crisis created a general 
consensus among policy makers that sustainable public finances is of utmost impor-
tance or it could be that the fiscal framework that was introduced after the banking 
crisis has affected actual behavior. The Swedish fiscal framework has not contributed 
to a deterioration of public finances, before or during the crisis. The focus on the sur-
plus target in combination to the expenditure ceiling could instead be interpreted as a 
replacement of deficit bias with a surplus bias. The second factor was that unem-
ployment did not rise as much as could have been expected. Aggregate demand re-
mained high as a result. Employment in the service sector actually increased during 
the crisis, which to some extent counteracted increased unemployment in the manu-
facturing sector. 
 
6. Summary 
 
This paper has evaluated and discussed the performance of Swedish public finances 
during the current financial crisis. The development of both government debt and in 
particular net lending puts Sweden as a good candidate for a “best in class” award 
among the 27 EU member states. Public finances in Sweden are very strong and de-
spite a very large drop in GDP during 2008-2009 period, public finances did not de-
teriorate as much as in the EU countries on average. This is particularly surprising 
since GDP fell less in EU on average than in Sweden. We identify two main reasons 
why the Swedish development was different. First, Sweden entered the financial cri-
sis with very strong public finances and second that that unemployment did not rise 
as much as normally when GDP fall. An underlying factor explaining why Sweden 
entered the crisis with strong public finances is the fiscal framework. The focus on 
long-term sustainable public finances since the banking crisis in the 1990s has had a 
significant effect on the developments of government and net lending. The surplus 
target in combination with the expenditure ceiling seems to have lead to strong pub-
lic finances. Comparing the behavior of net lending before and after the implementa-
tion of the fiscal framework, suggest a significant shift in net lending. The reason 
why unemployment did not rise was that aggregate demand remained high and that 
employment in the service sector increased and to a large extent offset the increase in 
unemployment in the manufacturing sector. There are some indications of labor  
450  Michael Bergman 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 4, pp. 431-453 
hording during the crisis. Additional reasons may also be the sharp fall in the cost of 
sick leave and the earned income tax reforms implemented during the last five-year 
period. The Swedish government has had some room for maneuver even during the 
crisis to use discretionary fiscal policies. 
What are the lessons that can be drawn from the Swedish case? Even though 
the fiscal framework seems to have contributed to the sustainability of public fi-
nances there are a few drawbacks to the current framework. First, it is unfortunate 
that the target for total government net lending is called a surplus target. This term 
may imply that the target always should be a surplus in net lending. This may not 
necessarily be the case. It is not evident that a deficit target or balanced net lending is 
appropriate, what is perhaps more important is that there exists a target for total gov-
ernment net lending. It should also be noted that the current target of a 1 percent sur-
plus implies that net financial worth will stabilize around the current value. If nomi-
nal GDP growth is 5 percent per year and the surplus target is 1 percent of GDP, then 
the surplus is sufficient to offset the decrease in net worth as a percentage of GDP 
that would otherwise occur when GDP grows, see Finanspolitiska rådet (2008). A 
lower GDP growth would imply that net financial worth as a percentage of GDP 
converges to a higher number than the initial level. Thus, a surplus target will in 
combination to average GDP growth determine the steady–state level of net financial 
worth. It may well be that the current level of net financial worth is not appropriate 
and therefore it may be more appropriate to have surplus target of -1 percent of GDP. 
For these reasons it is, perhaps, better to use the term target for total government net 
lending instead of the term surplus target. 
The advantage of having an explicit target for total government net lending is 
that both experience and economic research suggest that there is a deficit bias in most 
developed countries. A statutory target could minimize the deficit bias. A surplus 
target may also have direct economic effects in the form of lower risk premiums 
through increased credibility if a target can be uphold without large costs. 
A second lesson is that it must be possible to evaluate whether a target for to-
tal government net lending has been met or not. Therefore, it is preferable if it is 
formulated in terms of well-defined indicators that are easily measured. In this re-
gard, the Swedish surplus target is perhaps not the most optimal as it is defined as an 
average of a business cycle and is evaluated using measures of structural net lending. 
The empirical evidence on the importance of fiscal frameworks is consistent 
with the Swedish experience. Countries having fiscal frameworks have in general 
lower debt ratios and tend to avoid large deficits in net lending. Whether this is a re-
sult of fiscal frameworks or that countries where governments are more inclined to 
focus on sustainable fiscal policy is an open question. Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni 
Dell’Ariccia, and Paolo Mauro (2010) offers an overview on how the current finan-
cial crisis has affected the view of economic policy and discusses the open questions 
on how to design economic policy in the future. One important question is that there 
must be more emphasis on how to create more room for maneuver in fiscal policy, in 
other words, how to create incentives to prevent increasing debt levels during good 
times. Economic research shows that the fiscal framework can play an important role 
(George Kopits and Steven Symansky 1998) and that such frameworks systemati- 
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cally leads to stronger public finances, see for example Jürgen von Hagen (1992), the 
contributions in James Poterba and von Hagen (1999) and Mark Hallerberg, Rolf 
Strauch, and von Hagen (2009). For example, António Afonso and Sebastian 
Hauptmeier (2009) show that rules regulating fiscal policy systematically lead to sus-
tainable public finances. Xavier Debrun et al. (2008) find that targets for government 
net lending also lead to a more favorably budget outcomes. The conclusion is that 
fiscal frameworks tend to be associated with lower deficits of net lending and lower 
debt ratios. Lars Calmfors and Simon Wren-Lewis (2011) discuss the role that fiscal 
policy watchdogs can play and the underlying arguments for setting up such institu-
tions. Finally, IMF (2009) shows that budgetary frameworks that are largely statutory 
are generally more effective than those that are not. Even without drawing too strong 
conclusions from this literature, it is perhaps worth experimenting with fiscal rules in 
countries that currently suffers under a heavy debt burden. Fiscal rules that are clear 
and well-defined, may increase the credibility of fiscal policy and thereby reduce the 
risk premiums that these countries have to pay in order to service the debt. 
The current financial crisis has clearly shown that it is not enough to put more 
emphasis on fiscal stability, it is also important to improve the surveillance of finan-
cial stability. Financial crises occur as they have done previously and are likely to 
also occur in the future. In this regard, it is important also to formulate escape clauses 
stipulating under what circumstances it is appropriate to disregard the fiscal frame-
work. During normal times we should allow the fiscal framework to guide fiscal pol-
icy but when a deep crisis occurs, it may be necessary to allow net lending to signifi-
cantly deviate from the target used. Such rules should be very explicit and there 
should be well-defined rules stipulating the non-normal circumstances. Such rules do 
not exist in the Swedish fiscal framework. It is difficult to know beforehand what 
would have happened in Sweden if the current crisis had lead to widespread banking 
failures. In such a scenario, the government cannot by referring to the actual fiscal 
framework refuse to rescue the banking sector or to use discretionary fiscal policy to 
stimulate the economy. Escape clauses may increase the credibility of the fiscal 
framework as departures from the framework are allowed under special circum-
stances. There is scope for improvement even in the best of all worlds. 
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